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 “...looking across at our primate relatives learning local traditions, using tools, and 
manipulating symbols, we can no longer say comfortably that ‘culture’ is the 
heritage of learned symbolic behaviour that makes humans human.” R. Keesing 
(1974: 73) 
 
1. Expanding Our Understanding of Culture 
 
A consequence of human evolution that has had the most profound impact on human 
nature and human society was the emergence of culture.  A term credited uniquely to 
humans, however over the course of the last century new developments in animal 
behaviour have been introduced, indicating perhaps that our understanding of culture is 
too limited, despite there being a vast amount of theoretical approaches to culture.  
Before we can further attempt to understand whether or not culture can be attributed to 
animals, we must first closely examine the concept of culture from a human 
perspective, including a detailed analysis of the role which language plays in 
maintaining culture.  It could be argued that if animals were attributed with the ability 
to sustain culture, the very notion alone would bring into question humanity’s, albeit 
arrogant view, that as a species we are more than an animal.  The term human in itself 
purposefully separates us from all other living creatures on this planet.  An aspect that 
has affected the world over ecologically as in every known part of the world where 
humans reside, the environment during the last century alone has suffered 
consequences of humanity’s so-called ‘superiority’. It serves to segregate ‘the other’; in 
this case being any other species than human whilst also segregating humanity from an 
innate connection with this world, that is humanity has lost touch with its symbiotic 
relationship with earth. Thus, the debate over whether or not culture solely exists 
amongst humanity is in itself arguable as it is through various forms of culture, albeit 
some more complex than others, that all species can adapt and survive in any given 
eco-system and or environment.  
 
Emily Schultz & Robert Lavenda (1995) argue that culture makes us unique as a 
species as we are more dependent than any other species on learning for survival 
because we have no instincts that automatically protect us and find us food and shelter.  
They also argue that we have come to use our complex intelligence in order to learn 
from other members of society what we need to know to survive, otherwise known as 
enculturation.  This teaching and learning process is a primary focus of childhood, 
which is longer for humans than for any other species.i  Within the anthropological 
perspective, it is culture; according to Schultz & Lavenda that is central to not only 
understanding why humans are the way they are but also why as a species we behave 
the way that we do.  Thus, a human behaves the way he or she does because of the 
process of enculturation and not as a result of his or her being genetically programmed 
to be a certain way.  It is fair to insinuate that most anthropologists reject explanations 
of human behaviour that force them to choose between biology and culture as the 
cause.  Rather, anthropologists prefer to emphasize that human beings are biocultural 
organisms.  As Schultz and Lavenda state: 
 “Our genetically guided biological makeup, including our brain, nervous system, and 
anatomy, makes us capable of creating and using culture.  Without these biological 
ITB Journal  
Issue Number 17, May 2008                                                     Page 70 
endowments, human culture as we know it would not exist.  At the same time, our 
survival as biological organisms depends upon learned cultural traditions that help us 
find food, shelter, and mates, and that teach us how to rear our offspring.  This is 
because our biological endowment, rich as it is, does not provide us with instincts that 
would take care of these survival needs.  Human biology makes culture possible; 
human culture makes human biological survival possible. (1995: 5) 
   
Does human biology make culture possible?  Is it truly a uniquely human attribute or 
are there different ways of life that transcend humanity all together, that in their own 
right are working social structures not unlike the concept of culture itself?  It is 
undoubtedly true that human culture makes human biological survival possible for the 
most part, but as we have seen through the history of human evolution, food, shelter 
and clothing did not always consist of mini malls, McDonald’s and Ralph Lauren shirts 
and Calvin Klein jeans.  Indeed, such attributes to human survival are still only unique 
to certain parts of the globe, particularly western cultures.  Consequently, these notions 
of the superiority of the human condition predominate many of the discussions 
revolving around the concept of culture, often treating our ability to survive as not 
simply the only way a human being can live and breathe on this spaceship called earth, 
but as well as the more favorable, civilized way of life.  Thus, excluding all other non-
human mammals from the concept of culture and treating them as savages in our midst, 
allowing to live or let die, depending on the particular needs of the culture which 
happens to be overlapping with earth’s other inhabitants is inherently savage in itself of 
our species.  However, before we can continue to explore this concept, which will be 
referred to as animal culture for argument’s sake, let us first turn to the different 
concepts and attributes of culture that have been discussed by other anthropological and 
sociological minds. 
 
According to Roger M. Keesing (1974) applying an evolutionary model of natural 
selection to cultural constriction in biological foundations has led anthropologists to ask 
with increasing sophistication how human communities develop particular cultural 
patterns.  How have cultures developed and what forces shape them?  How are cultures 
learned?  How do shared symbolic systems transcend individual thought words?  How 
different and unique are cultures really?  Do universal patterns underlie diversity?  How 
is cultural description to be possible?ii  These are but some of the questions being 
sought when trying to understand and answer the increasingly more complex question 
of what culture truly entails.  From the standpoint of cultural theory, however, the 
major developments have come from evolutionary/ecological approaches to cultures as 
adaptive systems.  The foundations laid by Leslie White have been creatively recast by 
such scholars as Sahlins, Rappaport, Vayda, and Harris for instance.iii   This is not to 
say that a consensus has been met but rather, increasingly, most scholars such as the 
exchange between Service (1968), and Harris (1969), Marxist critiques of Harris’ 
cultural materialism, the gulfs between cultural ecology conceived by Vayda & 
Rappaport (1968)... all attest to the diversity and disagreement of the concept of culture.  
The broad assumptions that most scholars do agree on, according to Keesing (1974) 
are: 
 “(a) Cultures are systems (of socially transmitted behaviour patterns) that serve to 
relate human communities to their ecological settings.  These ways-of-life-of 
communities include technologies and modes of social grouping and political 
organization, religious beliefs and practices, and so on.  When cultures are viewed 
broadly as behaviour systems characteristic of populations, extending and permuting 
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somatic givens, whether we consider them to be patterns of culture or patterns for 
behaviour is a secondary question.” 
 
“Culture is all those things means whose forms are not quite under direct genetic 
control which serve to adjust individuals and groups within their ecological 
communities.”  (Binford, 1968: 323)  
 
“The culture concept comes down to behaviour patterns associated with particular 
groups of peoples, that is to ‘customs’ or to peoples’ ‘way of life’ (Harris, 1968: 16) 
 
(b) Cultural change is primarily a process of adaptation and what amounts to natural 
selection. 
 
“Man is an animal and, like all other animals, must maintain an adaptive relationship 
with his surroundings in order to survive.  Although he achieves this adaptation 
principally through the medium of culture, the process is guided by the same rules of 
natural selection that govern biological adaptation.” (Insert italics mine!) (Meggers, 
1971: 4) 
 
[Culture is s]een as adaptive systems, cultures change in the direction of equilibrium 
within ecosystems; but when balances are upset by environmental, demographic, 
technological, or other systemic changes, further adjustive changes ramify through the 
cultural system.  Feedback mechanisms in cultural systems may thus operate both 
negatively (toward self-correction and equilibrium) and positively (toward 
disequilibrium and directional change).   
 
(c) Technology, subsistence economy, and elements of social organization directly tied 
to production are the most adaptively central realms of culture.  It is in these realms 
that adaptive changes usually begin and from which they usually ramify.  ... [Harris, 
Marxists, Rappaport and Vayda]... would view economies and their social correlates 
as in some sense primary, and ideational systems-religion, ritual, world view- as in 
some sense secondary, derived epiphenomenal.   
 
“Similar technologies applied to similar environments tend to produce similar 
arrangements of labor in production and distribution, and ... these in turn call forth 
similar kinds of social groupings, which justify and coordinate their activities by means 
of similar systems of values and beliefs.” (Harris, 1968: 4)    
 
(d) The ideational components of cultural systems may have adaptive consequences-in 
controlling population, contributing to subsistence, maintaining the ecosystem, etc; and 
these, though often subtle, must be carefully traced wherever they lead: 
 
[However,] “...it is necessary to consider the total culture when analyzing adaptation.  
Superficially, it might be assumed that attention could be confined to aspects directly 
related to the environment... [But] whether analysis begins with religious practices, 
social organization, or some other sector of a cultural complex ... [it] will... reveal 
functional relationships with other categories of behaviour that are adaptive.” 
(Meggers, 1971: 43) 
 (Keesing, 1974: 75-77) 
 
The above illustrates the similarities and yet the stark contrast between theoretical 
approaches to better understanding the notions of culture.  Culture in itself embodies 
what humanity has achieved through millennia of evolution and natural selection.  
However it is Meggers (1971) whom seems confident in linking humanity itself to the 
bare truth, that humans are animals.  Like most living creatures on this planet, humanity 
is by its innate nature a social entity.  One which must adhere to natural selection and in 
so doing must facilitate its existence by utilizing the very tools nature bestowed unto us, 
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primarily language.  However, before language can be considered let us first further 
examine culture by introducing it not as a recent phenomenon, but rather one that has 
existed since the birth of humanity whilst taking into consideration that language in and 
of itself is in fact a recent phenomenon.  One which only takes into consideration 
modern society negating the possibility, if not almost purposefully ignoring that 
cultures were not always as sophisticated as Marxists, Harris, or Keesing would have us 
believe.  Cultures are located in time and space by the temporal and spatial distribution 
of the individuals sharing them.iv  They exist only in the minds of the people sharing 
that culture and although one can not underestimate nor dilute the vast 
accomplishments humanity has succeeded in bearing; it too can not go unaccounted for 
that, like all animals, we have evolved from a point of existence where culture simply 
consisted of a set of ideas and way of life.  A way of life that, as we have seen through 
primates, are distant echoes of a time when humanity was as vulnerable as those 
animals that live under our rule today.   
  
Thus what forms culture can take inevitably depends on the ability of the group and of 
the individual to think of, imagine, and learn.  As well, an innate ability to be able to 
pass this information on to new members either through rearing of children 
(enculturation) or assimilation of another group must be accomplished within a 
simplistic means of acculturation for the latter.  Thus, cultures must be thinkable and 
learnable as well as livable in that the ecosystem also plays a role in helping develop 
the type of condition and life style that will take place.  It is through such adaptationists 
theoretical frameworks that one may consider human culture as the ideal, but it can also 
be used to explain how animal culture itself exists.  However, ideational archetypes 
exist about culture, attempting further to distance humans from that inner animal which 
seems to cling at our consciousness as we strive to be more than the sum of our 
biological parts.  Keesing distinguishes three different ways of approaching cultures as 
systems of ideas.  First, cultures must be seen as a cognitive system.  According to 
Ward Goodenough (1957): 
 “Culture is not a material phenomenon; it does not consist of things, people, 
behaviour, or emotions.  It is rather an organization of these things.  It is the form of 
things that people have in mind, their models for perceiving, relating, and otherwise 
interpreting them.” (167) 
 
Second, are Cultures of Structural systems, where Levi-Strauss views cultures a shared 
symbolic systems that are cumulative creations of mind; he seeks to discover in the 
structuring of cultural domains- myth, art, kinship, language- the principles, he feels of 
the mind that generates cultural elaborations.  Thus, the physical world which humans 
live within may provide the raw materials necessary to make their visions into a reality, 
however, the mind in itself imposes culturally patterned order, “... a logic of binary 
contrast, of relations and transformations, on a continuously changing and often random 
world.”v  A symbolic polarity develops, one between that of Nature vs. Culture.  Levi- 
Strauss himself becomes concerned with ‘Culture’ rather than with ‘a culture’:  
 “...he sees American Indian mythic structures as overlapping, interconnected patterns 
that transcend not only cognitive organization of [the] individual  ... but in a sense 
transcend as well the boundaries of language and custom that divide different 
peoples.” (Keesing, 1974: 79)   
 
Third, Keesing introduces Cultures as Symbolic Systems, where Clifford Geertz, like 
Levi Strauss, has over time become increasingly systematic.  Unlike Strauss, however, 
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he finds inspiration for work in the individual in real life settings, such as his work 
regarding the cock fight, a funeral, and a sheep theft.  According to Keesing: 
“[Geertz] ...sees the cognitive view of Goodenough and the ‘new ethnographers’ as 
reductionistic and spuriously formalistic.  ... symbols and meanings are shared by 
social actors- between, not in them; they are public, not private.” (1974: 79) 
 
Thus, cultural systems become ideational while such cultural patterns themselves are 
not reified or metaphysical but rather, like rocks and dreams, “they are things of this 
world.”vi  Geertz himself views his notions of culture as ‘semiotie’- thus, to study 
culture is to study shared codes of meaning.  Geertz refers to cultures as being like old 
cities: or rather, the problem of cultural analysis is as much of determining 
independencies as interconnection, gulfs as well as bridges he states.  According to 
Geertz: 
“...The appropriate image, if one must have images, of cultural organization, is either 
the spider web nor the pile of sand.  It is rather more the octopus, whose tentacles are in 
large part separately integrated, neurally quite poorly connected with one another and 
with what in the octopus passes for a brain, and yet who nonetheless manages to get 
around and preserve himself, ... as a viable, if somewhat ungainly entity.” (1966: 66-
67)    
 
Thus, Geertz argues that culture in and of itself is best seen as a set of behaviour 
patterns, concrete yet complex which include customs, usages, traditions, and habit 
clusters, however, they also work as a set of control mechanisms for the governing of 
social behaviour amongst individual participants within a given culture.  Thus far we 
have seen that, amongst many things, culture is a system of knowledge, shaped and 
constrained by the way the human brain not only acquires information, but also by the 
environment in which a culture must exist.  It is also the ways which humans organize 
and process the information and create an internal model of reality, albeit only valid 
when within their own particular culture.  At this elementary definition of culture, it can 
be argued than that animals do possess the capabilities of understanding and creating a 
system of knowledge and tools to pass on learned information from one generation to 
the next.  For the purpose of this argument we will examine shortly the social structure 
of primates, particularly, chimpanzees.  However, first we must take a closer look at the 
way culture is transmitted from one generation to the next and what, according to many 
theorists makes us superior to animals.  Naturally, we are talking about language and 
mind.   
 
2. Of Language and Mind 
 
“Speech is a non-instinctive, acquired, ‘cultural function’.” Edward Sapir (1949: 4) 
 
The human mind, it would seem, would be the natural equivalent to the lion’s teeth and 
claws, or rather more humbly, the varied stripes of a zebra.  Its origins have long been a 
popular subject, as some reasonable and other not so reasonable claims have been 
proposed: ‘Exclamations become words; sounds in nature were imitated, or people 
simply got together and assigned sounds to objects and actions.’ Such wild speculation 
on the origins of language inevitably led to a ban imposed in 1866 by the Societe de 
Linguistique de Paris against papers on linguistic origins.vii Due to the wealth of 
information gathered over the last century on primate brains, the development of 
linguistic competence of children, more human fossils that can tentatively be used to 
reconstruct what brains and vocal tracts must have been like, and a better understanding 
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of early hominid way of life have all given way to new theoretical developments in 
answering the question whether or not language determines culture or whether culture 
determines language.  Nevertheless, language is a tool which allows us to survive in a 
world where we have no other means of protection.  As Geertz surmises, through trial 
and error humanity managed to thrive in the process of natural selection.  His approach 
to the acquisition of language as a system of communication in order to pass on 
information and understanding of the cultural view of the world in which one lives 
would fall in adequately with the above notions of culture.   
 
However, it is not until one stumbles upon Noam Chomsky (1968) and Eleanor Ochs 
(1998) do we get an understanding of how language during contemporary time helps 
not simply to enrich our minds, but that has become the medium necessary to maintain 
the industrial world.  The mind is a complex web of information, how the mind is 
conditioned within any given human culture (initially) can only be acquired via 
language.  Language, it is argued, is the sole means in which a human acquires culture; 
this entails one’s understanding of reality and sets forth a set of grammatical rules that 
ensure our ability to properly understand it. It serves a purpose, that is to allow 
humanity to maintain its idealized fiction of the world, however it does not serve as a 
means of creating culture, but rather, it simply maintains it within human culture.  Ochs 
surmises that the process of socialization enables us to determine all facets of culturally 
social acceptable behaviour. Thus, as we constantly strive to better ourselves as a 
species, including our understanding of the physical world around us in relation to how 
our minds perceive it, so too then must language be changed and improved upon to 
accommodate the needs of the group.  One can claim that the concept of ‘mind’ from an 
anthropological point of view clearly stipulates that the mind can not function to its full 
potential without the use of language, nor can language in and of itself exist without the 
mind to put it into practice.  Thus, in this sense, the mind utilizes language as a tool 
which is embedded in our sub-conscious but can only function through the process of 
socialization. Once we have attained the basis for but one single dialect of language, the 
mind than becomes capable of learning other languages, inevitably aiding humanity’s 
efforts to continue perceiving the world through various views whilst still enriching the 
individual’s own understanding of how our own minds function in relation to the world 
around us.   
 
Nevertheless, the debate between Ochs’ and Chomsky’s two contrasting positions 
regarding the acquisition of language can perhaps be placed into two categories; that of 
‘innateism vs. socialization.’  Ochs’ own view discusses further the process in which 
children must learn a language as governed by their respective culture via a process that 
is relational to their own environment.  She gives an example using the Samoan 
discourse of language acquisition.  In it she discusses how Samoan children learn their 
language in context to their setting (i.e. Front of house, back of house & side of house) 
and relationship with the individual the child is communicating with, (i.e. doctor-
patient, student-teacher, child-child, etc.).  Caregivers encourage children to use only 
‘good language’ (Written Samoan) as opposed to ‘bad language’ (Slang-Non-Written 
Samoan).viii In doing so, children learn their language in contrast to their environment.  
Thus, it can be argued that the process of acquiring language is situational and can not 
be undertaken without the condition(s) of a group’s environment.  In such an instance, 
both language increases the awareness of their mind and environment while the reverse 
takes place as well.   
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However, according to Noam Chomsky, the acquisition of language can be understood 
as an innate ability that human kind possesses.  His work, a reflection of how language 
contributes to the environment of our mind, indicates that there is no concrete proof that 
human language is not already part of our innate abilities as a species.  He states that 
though humanity requires at any age to be taught the rudimentary elements of their 
respective language, humanity nevertheless have within us a working knowledge, albeit 
sub-consciously, of what language is and how it functions.ix  Both Chomsky and Ochs 
attempt to show that language is in itself the building blocks of how we understand and 
perceive not only the world in which we reside, but each other and, as well, ourselves.  
Their two different approaches compliment each other in that Chomsky’s view of 
humanity having an innate ability to understand language coincides with Ochs’ theory 
of socialization.  Combined, these two theoretical approaches to the acquisition of 
language also allow us to better understand humanity’s ability to distinguish between 
the many facets of language, such as meta-communicative markings, symbols and 
signs. 
 
This innate ability to be able to speak is what many social theorists claim as the driving 
force behind humanity’s success.  Geertz (1973) adds to this notion by surmising that 
an evolutionary approach must be undertaken and discusses the process of acquisition 
of language through the necessity to communicate information from generation to 
generation.x Chomsky elaborates on this innate ability by discussing how human 
language itself is shared by all humans, a sense of a priori knowledge and psychic unity, 
if you will, and is in essence not merely unique to only human kind, however just as 
importantly it is vital to our survival as a species; a claim that echoes the Sapir-Whorf 
Hypothesis: The view/belief that language determines the way in which we perceive the 
world around us.  These two views are as follows- the weak view, where language is 
viewed as an influence on thought itself vs. the strong view, where thought is 
determined solely by language.xi  This notion was studied indepthly by John Lucy 
(1972) who surmised further that in contemporary theoretical approaches today the 
view tends to hold that both language and thought (mind) must work together in 
relation to understanding and expanding on one another.  Jurgen Habermas (1988) 
implements this approach developing a theory of social order in which he postulates the 
existence of a background of universal, pereflexive, unthematic knowledge called the 
Lifeworld.  This ‘Lifeworld’ is manifested through a specific type of speech act called 
communicative action.  Communicative action enables access to the ‘binding and 
bonding of energies of language’ and is composed of structural constraints that together 
create an internal connection between meaning and validity.xii   
 
This pragmatic and non-semantic theory of meaning draws on Speech-Act theory and 
represents an epistemic turn in truth conditions as it goes beyond the linguistic 
utterance for validation while still recognizing the subjective positions of both, the 
speaker and hearer.  Participants in a communicative act are able to “connect up” view 
his notion of the Lifeworld.  Habermas extends his communicative theory to a theory of 
social action, to explain how social order is possible.  In his view, society is woven 
from webs of linguistically mediated interactions that draw upon the unethematic 
knowledge of the Lifeworld, and, through communicative acts, shape this knowledge 
into cultural paradigms, legitimate orders, and personality structures.  Habermas sees 
these as the three interrelated and interdependent components of the Lifeworld.  They 
reciprocally interact through communicative action with the Lifeworld, creating the 
possibility for social cohesion. Although Habermas proposes a theory that looks beyond 
the structural components of language to see how communicative action makes social 
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cohesion possible, in doing so, he places the power of language not as an entity in and 
of itself, as has been done many times before him (i.e. Chomsky) but as a tool used by 
people.  Indeed, the idea that two humans can connect in a communicative way so as to 
reach an understanding about the world must be the basis for cultural development, but 
the ways in which such a process is made possible has seemed to be often taken for 
granted.  
 
3. Conclusion 
 
These approaches work well in formulating and determining the nature and function of 
language in human culture, as Geertz (1973) continues to stipulate that the mind 
functions in processing and identifying information through a “concept that denotes a 
class of skills, propensities, capacities, tendencies, and habits.” (47-48).  This is 
achieved through primary and secondary cognition where substitution, reversal, and 
condensation are but a few aspects of the mind that come prior to directed, logically 
ordered, a human’s capability to reason.  He examines the growth potential of this 
ability through the evolution of the human species by both biological and social means 
of interpretation.  Based on a biological perspective, the human brain in and of itself is 
three times larger than our ancestors.  It is through a social outlook, however, that one 
can determine the growth of social behaviour by the stimulus deficit and stimulus 
discovery.  The first refers to an innate sense of curiosity that needs to be fulfilled 
whilst the latter is the satisfaction of our curiosity through trial and error.  It is through 
motivational problems, Geertz asserts, that culture and language evolve, a process 
linked directly to the notion of psychic unity where all human cultures share the same 
patterns of evolution but during different periods in time depending on such 
circumstances as environment.  However, though the above illustrates the purpose of 
the advancement of language, rather than of its origins and though it can be said that it 
allows any rational, intelligible person to derive the same conclusions when serious 
thought is given to the origins, nature and function of culture and language, it does not 
however answer the question clearly and concisely as to whether or not language is 
truly innate or not?  Thus, let us turn our attention to the notion that language itself 
merely defines what it is that a person or an animal feels.  That language as a tool can 
only strive to better itself in defining the complex emotions and thoughts that humans 
sense.  According to Edward Sapir (1949): 
 “…there are only organs that are incidentally useful in the production of speech 
sounds. … Physiologically speech is an overlaid function, or, to be more precise, a 
group of overlaid functions.  It gets what service it can out of organs and functions, 
nervous and muscular that have come into being and are maintained for very different 
ends of their own. …  Language is a purely human and non-instinctive (italics mine) 
method of communicating ideas, emotions, desires by means of a system of voluntarily 
produced symbols.  These symbols are, in the first instance, auditory … much 
instinctive expressions and the natural environment may serve as a stimulus for the 
development of certain elements of speech, however, much instinctive tendencies, motor 
and other, may give a predetermined range or mold to linguistic expression.  Such 
human or animal communication (italics mine) … as is brought about by involuntary, 
instinctive cries is not, in our sense, language at all.” (8-9)  
 
Despite his claim that an utterance or the vocal sound of pain or joy does not, as such, 
constitute language or a symbolic meaning, it does however; serve as a more or less 
automatic over flow of our emotional energy.  Rather, sound imitative words do not 
directly derive out of nature but instead are suggested, played with, hence the 
onomatopoetic theory of the origin of speech, the theory that would explain all speech 
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as a gradual evolution from sounds of an imitative character, really brings us no closer, 
according to Sapir, to the instinctive level than is language as we know it today.xiii  Still 
questions persist, ‘Can thought be possible without speech?’  If so, do primates not 
regularly utilize thought processes and judgments to maintain social cohesion, or to 
begin a war with neighboring groups?  Does not the Feral Child think without the 
concept of language as understood and defined by contemporary humanity?  Questions 
that will continue to persist as anthropologists continue to explore other forms of 
communication other than language.  Thus, language itself can be argued to be as 
limiting as it has been progressive for the human mind and has given us both our 
concepts of sameness and differences between us and ‘the other.’  
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